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Deliberation,	  Democracy	  and	  the	  Systemic	  Turn1	  
David	  Owen	  and	  Graham	  Smith2	  
Deliberative	  democracy	  as	  a	  theoretical	  enterprise	  has	  gone	  through	  a	  series	  of	  phases	  or	  
‘turns’.3	  The	  most	  recent	  manifestation	  of	  this	  dynamic	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  ‘deliberative	  
system’,	  of	  which	  a	  variety	  of	  formulations	  have	  been	  proposed.	  An	  important	  initial	  
attempt	  to	  offer	  a	  reflective	  synthesis	  of	  work	  on	  deliberative	  systems	  is	  the	  recent	  essay,	  ‘A	  
systemic	  approach	  to	  deliberative	  democracy’.4	  Co-­‐authored	  by	  an	  impressive	  range	  of	  
deliberative	  theorists	  (Jane	  Mansbridge,	  James	  Bohman,	  Simone	  Chambers,	  Thomas	  
Christiano,	  Archon	  Fung,	  John	  Parkinson,	  Dennis	  Thompson	  and	  Mark	  Warren),	  the	  essay	  
has	  become	  a	  manifesto	  for	  the	  systemic	  turn	  (henceforth	  we	  refer	  to	  the	  essay	  as	  the	  
‘Manifesto’).	  In	  this	  article,	  we	  offer	  a	  critical	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  systemic	  turn	  and,	  more	  
particularly,	  the	  theoretical	  trajectory	  proposed	  by	  the	  Manifesto.	  Specifically,	  we	  
distinguish	  the	  characteristics	  of	  currently	  dominant	  approaches	  to	  deliberative	  systems,	  
arguing	  that	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  be	  cautious	  concerning	  the	  merits	  of	  this	  systemic	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  been	  generous	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  offering	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  on	  several	  versions	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  this	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  and	  pushing	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  to	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  would	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John	  Parkinson,	  Tomer	  Perry	  and	  Dennis	  Thompson	  for	  comments	  on	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  well	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  University	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turn	  and	  sceptical	  in	  respect	  of	  its	  credentials	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  as	  
a	  political	  ideal.	  We	  offer	  a	  sustained	  critique	  of	  the	  current	  trajectory	  of	  the	  deliberative	  
systems	  literature,	  before	  sketching	  two	  constructive	  alternatives.	  
	  
Contextualising	  the	  Systemic	  Turn	  	  
The	  initial	  wave	  of	  work	  on	  deliberative	  democracy	  focused	  on	  the	  emergence	  and	  
refinement	  of	  the	  ideal	  of	  deliberation	  and	  the	  articulation	  of	  deliberative	  democracy.5	  
Conceptual	  debate	  over	  the	  specification	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  ideal	  of	  deliberation	  continues	  
apace,	  incorporating,	  for	  example,	  feminist	  theorists’	  expansion	  of	  what	  can	  reasonably	  be	  
understood	  as	  reason-­‐giving.6	  	  
In	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  scholarship,	  its	  ‘empirical	  turn’,	  scholars	  have	  studied	  applications	  of	  
deliberative	  democracy,	  including,	  for	  example,	  forms	  of	  mini-­‐publics,	  constitutional	  courts	  
and	  legislatures	  both	  in	  open	  and	  closed	  session.7	  Although	  these	  studies	  help	  clarify	  the	  
institutional	  conditions	  under	  which	  good	  quality	  deliberation	  might	  be	  enabled,	  a	  
reasonable	  criticism	  is	  that	  too	  often	  the	  analysis	  prioritises	  ‘discrete	  instances	  of	  
deliberation,	  investigated	  with	  little	  if	  any	  attention	  to	  their	  relationship	  to	  the	  system	  as	  a	  
whole’.8	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  1996;	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  1996;	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  Young	  1990.	  
7	  E.g.	  Fung	  2003;	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  Mansbridge	  et	  al.	  2012,	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  see	  also	  Parkinson	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  Thompson	  2008;	  Stevenson	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  Dryzek	  2014.	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Many	  have	  seen	  the	  systemic	  turn	  as	  a	  natural	  development	  in	  the	  life-­‐history	  of	  
deliberative	  democracy,	  a	  third	  phase	  that	  extends	  the	  conception	  of	  deliberative	  
democracy	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  deliberative	  characteristics	  of	  the	  political	  system	  as	  a	  
whole.	  As	  the	  Manifesto	  argues:	  
No	  single	  forum,	  however	  ideally	  constituted	  could	  possess	  deliberative	  capacity	  
sufficient	  to	  legitimate	  most	  of	  the	  decisions	  and	  policies	  that	  democracies	  adopt.	  To	  
understand	  the	  larger	  goal	  of	  deliberation,	  we	  suggest	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  go	  
beyond	  the	  study	  of	  individual	  institutions	  and	  processes	  to	  examine	  their	  
interaction	  in	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  We	  recognize	  that	  most	  democracies	  are	  
complex	  entities	  in	  which	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  institutions,	  associations,	  and	  sites	  of	  
contestation	  accomplish	  political	  work	  –	  including	  informal	  networks,	  the	  media,	  
organized	  advocacy	  groups,	  schools,	  foundations,	  private	  and	  non-­‐profit	  institutions,	  
legislatures,	  executive	  agencies,	  and	  the	  courts.	  We	  thus	  advocate	  what	  may	  be	  
called	  a	  systemic	  approach	  to	  deliberative	  democracy.’9	  	  
But	  just	  as	  there	  has	  been	  theoretical	  contestation	  in	  the	  first	  two	  waves	  of	  deliberative	  
democracy	  scholarship	  as	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  deliberative	  ideal	  and	  how	  and	  where	  it	  
should	  be	  applied,	  this	  is	  also	  the	  case	  with	  respect	  to	  conceptualizations	  of	  the	  deliberative	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Theories	  of	  deliberative	  systems	  
While	  reference	  is	  often	  made	  to	  Mansbridge’s	  essay	  ‘Everyday	  talk	  in	  the	  deliberative	  
system’10	  as	  the	  first	  time	  the	  term	  ‘deliberative	  system’	  has	  been	  used	  explicitly,	  a	  systemic	  
approach	  to	  deliberative	  democracy	  is	  already	  in	  evidence	  in	  Jürgen	  Habermas’	  earlier	  
conceptualisation	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  offered	  in	  Beyond	  Facts	  and	  Norms.11	  In	  a	  
conception	  frequently	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘two-­‐track	  model’	  of	  deliberative	  democracy,	  
Habermas	  distinguishes	  between	  opinion	  formation	  in	  the	  informal	  public	  sphere	  and	  will-­‐
formation	  in	  formal	  representative	  institutions,	  placing	  emphasis	  on	  the	  transmission	  
mechanisms	  between	  the	  two	  spheres	  of	  activity.	  
Mansbridge	  adopted	  the	  term	  ‘deliberative	  system’	  for	  a	  different	  purpose:	  as	  part	  of	  a	  
strategy	  to	  extend	  the	  conception	  of	  the	  type	  of	  ‘talk’	  that	  should	  be	  considered	  by	  
deliberative	  democrats.	  Her	  aim	  is	  to	  extend	  the	  dominant	  conception	  of	  deliberative	  
democracy	  in	  three	  ways:	  broadening	  the	  forms	  of	  communication	  that	  fall	  under	  our	  
conception	  of	  ‘deliberation’;	  including	  the	  wide	  variety	  of	  forms	  of	  ‘everyday	  talk’	  
addressing	  matters	  that	  should	  be	  discussed	  by	  the	  public	  (including	  societal	  norms)	  within	  
the	  conception	  of	  a	  deliberative	  system;	  and,	  in	  so	  doing,	  moving	  the	  field	  of	  deliberative	  
democracy	  beyond	  its	  obsession	  with	  formal	  political	  forums	  and	  processes.	  In	  developing	  a	  
more	  systemic	  account,	  she	  offers	  a	  refrain	  that	  is	  to	  become	  common	  in	  the	  deliberative	  
systems	  literature:	  ‘the	  criterion	  for	  good	  deliberation	  should	  be	  not	  that	  every	  interaction	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in	  the	  system	  exhibit	  mutual	  respect,	  consistency,	  acknowledgement,	  openmindedness	  and	  
moral	  economy,	  but	  that	  the	  system	  reflect	  those	  goods’.12	  
As	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  deliberative	  system	  developed,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  influence	  of	  both	  
Habermas	  and	  Mansbridge.	  John	  Dryzek	  has	  been	  prolific	  in	  popularising	  the	  systemic	  turn	  
and	  in	  a	  number	  of	  publications	  has	  offered	  a	  schematisation	  of	  the	  components	  or	  
elements	  of	  a	  deliberative	  system	  that	  develops	  Habermas’	  original	  characterisation.	  His	  
most	  expansive	  and	  recent	  characterisation	  of	  these	  components	  is:	  	  
• private	  sphere	  (akin	  to	  the	  site	  of	  Mansbridge’s	  everyday	  talk)	  
• public	  space	  
• empowered	  space	  
• transmission	  (from	  public	  space	  to	  empowered	  space)	  
• accountability	  (of	  empowered	  space	  to	  public	  space)	  
• meta-­‐deliberation	  (about	  the	  deliberative	  qualities	  of	  the	  system	  itself)	  	  
• decisiveness	  (in	  relation	  to	  other	  political	  forces)13	  	  
For	  Dryzek,	  a	  deliberative	  system	  should	  be	  judged	  by	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  is	  ‘authentic,	  
inclusive	  and	  consequential’,14	  although	  ‘the	  component	  parts	  of	  a	  system	  can	  themselves	  
be	  more	  or	  less	  authentically	  deliberative’.15	  Dryzek’s	  account	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  
pays	  specific	  attention	  to	  the	  contestation	  of	  discourses	  within	  public	  space	  and	  the	  extent	  
to	  which	  these	  discourses	  are	  recognised	  and	  considered	  within	  empowered	  space.	  For	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Ibid.,	  p.	  224.	  
13	  Stevenson	  and	  Dryzek	  2014,	  pp.	  27-­‐29;	  see	  previously	  Dryzek	  2010,	  pp.	  11-­‐12;	  2011,	  pp.	  225-­‐26.	  
14	  Ibid,	  p.32.	  
15	  Ibid.	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Dryzek,	  along	  with	  theorists	  such	  as	  Bohman,	  the	  deliberative	  system	  is	  de-­‐centred	  from	  a	  
focus	  on	  the	  state,	  enabling	  analysis	  of	  deliberative	  systems	  at	  any	  level	  and	  form	  of	  
governance.16	  
Variations	  on	  the	  systems	  approach	  are	  offered	  by	  Goodin	  and	  by	  Parkinson,	  who	  both	  draw	  
on	  and	  develop	  the	  idea	  of	  sequences.	  For	  Goodin,	  the	  virtues	  associated	  with	  deliberation	  
can	  be	  dispersed	  between	  and	  across	  different	  institutions.	  He	  explicitly	  establishes	  his	  
approach	  as:	  
An	  alternative	  to	  the	  ‘unitary’	  model	  of	  deliberation	  that	  presently	  dominates	  
discussion	  among	  deliberative	  democrats.	  In	  this	  model	  of	  ‘distributed	  deliberation’,	  
the	  component	  deliberative	  virtues	  are	  on	  display	  sequentially,	  over	  the	  course	  of	  
this	  staged	  deliberation	  involving	  various	  component	  parts,	  rather	  than	  continuously	  
and	  simultaneously	  present	  as	  they	  would	  be	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  unitary	  deliberative	  
actor.17	  	  
Using	  a	  schematised	  understanding	  of	  the	  institutions	  of	  representative	  democracy	  –	  caucus	  
room,	  parliamentary	  debate,	  election	  campaign,	  post-­‐election	  bargaining	  –	  he	  argues	  that	  
although	  none	  of	  these	  institutions	  alone	  realises	  deliberative	  standards,	  as	  a	  system	  they	  
express	  the	  relevant	  deliberative	  qualities.	  For	  Goodin,	  the	  key	  is	  that	  these	  qualities	  or	  
virtues	  are	  realised	  at	  some	  point	  in	  the	  system,	  in	  the	  right	  order	  or	  combination	  and	  with	  
positive	  interactions	  among	  parts	  of	  the	  sequence.18	  Similarly,	  Parkinson	  offers	  an	  account	  
of	  a	  sequence	  of	  institutions	  again	  using	  what	  he	  recognises	  as	  a	  highly	  stylised	  approach	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Dryzek	  2011,	  p.	  227;	  Bohman	  2012,	  p.	  85.	  
17	  Goodin	  2008,	  p.	  186.	  
18	  Ibid.,	  p.	  201.	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the	  different	  stages	  of	  decision:	  define,	  discuss,	  decide	  and	  implement.	  He	  argues	  that	  
different	  actors	  –	  activist	  networks,	  experts,	  bureaucracy,	  micro-­‐techniques,	  media,	  elected	  
assembly,	  direct	  techniques	  –	  play	  different	  roles	  in	  each	  of	  these	  stages:19	  ‘Each	  element	  in	  
such	  a	  system	  may	  not	  be	  perfectly	  deliberative	  or	  democratic	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  but	  may	  still	  
perform	  a	  useful	  function	  in	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole’.20	  For	  Parkinson,	  as	  with	  Goodin,	  the	  
‘timing	  and	  sequencing’	  of	  institutions	  is	  critical	  for	  the	  deliberative	  system.21	  	  
The	  2012	  Manifesto	  authored	  by	  Mansbridge	  and	  her	  colleagues	  is	  an	  explicit	  attempt	  to	  
synthesize	  these	  varying	  accounts	  of	  the	  deliberative	  system.22	  They	  offer	  the	  following	  
definition	  of	  a	  ‘deliberative	  system’:	  
A	  system	  here	  means	  a	  set	  of	  distinguishable,	  differentiated,	  but	  to	  some	  degree	  
interdependent	  parts,	  often	  with	  distributed	  functions	  and	  a	  division	  of	  labor,	  
connected	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  form	  a	  complex	  whole.	  It	  requires	  both	  differentiation	  
and	  integration	  among	  the	  parts.	  It	  requires	  some	  functional	  division	  of	  labor,	  so	  
that	  some	  parts	  do	  work	  that	  others	  cannot	  do	  so	  well.	  And	  it	  requires	  some	  
relational	  interdependence,	  so	  that	  a	  change	  in	  one	  component	  will	  bring	  about	  
change	  in	  some	  others.	  A	  deliberative	  system	  is	  one	  that	  encompasses	  a	  talk-­‐based	  
approach	  to	  political	  conflict	  and	  problem	  solving	  –	  through	  arguing,	  demonstrating,	  
expressing,	  and	  persuading.	  In	  a	  good	  deliberative	  system,	  persuasion	  that	  raises	  
relevant	  considerations	  should	  replace	  suppression,	  oppression,	  and	  thoughtless	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Parkinson	  2006,	  pp.	  166-­‐73.	  
20	  Ibid.,	  p.	  7.	  
21	  Ibid.,	  p.	  165.	  See	  also	  Bächtiger	  et	  al.	  2010,	  p.	  59.	  
22	  The	  first	  footnote	  in	  the	  2012	  essay	  highlights	  these	  and	  other	  precursors	  (Mansbridge	  et	  al.	  2012,	  p.	  2).	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neglect.	  Normatively,	  a	  systemic	  approach	  means	  that	  the	  system	  should	  be	  judged	  
as	  a	  whole	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  parts	  being	  judged	  independently.	  We	  need	  to	  ask	  not	  
only	  what	  good	  deliberation	  would	  be	  both	  in	  general	  and	  in	  particular	  settings,	  but	  
also	  what	  a	  good	  deliberative	  system	  would	  entail.23	  
The	  authors	  of	  the	  Manifesto	  argue	  that	  this	  approach	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  systems	  
understood	  as	  sets	  of	  institutions	  or	  issue-­‐areas.	  The	  elements	  of	  the	  deliberative	  system	  
that	  they	  highlight	  indicate	  the	  influence	  and	  development	  of	  the	  earlier	  accounts	  of	  both	  
Habermas	  and	  Mansbridge:	  
Deliberative	  systems	  include,	  roughly	  speaking,	  four	  main	  arenas:	  the	  binding	  
decisions	  of	  the	  state	  (both	  in	  law	  itself	  and	  its	  implementation);	  activities	  directly	  
related	  to	  preparing	  for	  those	  decisions;	  informal	  talk	  related	  to	  those	  binding	  
decisions;	  and	  arenas	  of	  formal	  or	  informal	  talk	  related	  to	  decisions	  on	  issues	  of	  
common	  concern	  that	  are	  not	  intended	  for	  binding	  decisions	  by	  the	  state.24	  
By	  focusing	  on	  Mansbridge’s	  contributions	  to	  the	  development	  of	  the	  systems	  approach,	  we	  
can	  see	  a	  significant	  change	  in	  emphasis	  in	  how	  the	  deliberative	  system	  is	  conceptualised:	  
from	  a	  concern	  with	  an	  expansive	  account	  of	  deliberation	  to	  a	  systemic	  account	  of	  
deliberative	  democracy.	  In	  her	  1999	  essay,	  the	  expansive	  account	  foregrounds	  two	  points.	  
The	  first	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  talk	  in	  its	  everyday	  sense	  can	  be	  part	  of	  a	  process	  
of	  practical	  reasoning	  in	  some	  formal	  or	  informal	  group	  oriented	  to	  practical	  judgment,	  and	  
that	  the	  larger	  deliberative	  system	  can	  correspondingly	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  process	  that	  
includes	  many	  forms	  of	  exchanging	  reasons	  between	  equals	  oriented	  to	  a	  shared	  practical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Mansbridge	  et	  al.	  2012,	  pp.	  4-­‐5.	  	  
24	  Ibid.,	  p.	  9.	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judgment.	  Deliberative	  democracy,	  which	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  mutual	  reasoning	  of	  citizens	  
qua	  citizen,	  is	  simply	  one	  species	  of	  communication	  within	  a	  deliberative	  system.	  Hence,	  
there	  is	  no	  necessary	  connection	  between	  the	  parts	  of	  the	  deliberative	  system	  and	  either	  
governmental	  settings	  or	  binding	  decision-­‐making.	  The	  second	  point	  is	  that	  deliberation	  
does	  not	  occur	  in	  isolation	  but	  is	  situated	  within	  a	  wider	  context	  characterised	  by	  a	  plurality	  
of	  non-­‐deliberative	  forms	  of	  discursive	  action	  and	  interaction	  that	  shapes	  it	  in	  various	  ways	  
that	  are	  liable	  to	  affect	  its	  quality.	  Hence,	  anyone	  concerned	  with	  deliberative	  democracy	  
must	  also	  be	  concerned	  with	  the	  wider	  discursive	  context	  –	  and	  indeed	  the	  institutions	  and	  
practices	  that	  structure	  that	  wider	  context.	  Reference	  to	  a	  ‘deliberative	  system’	  on	  this	  
expansive	  view	  is	  a	  shorthand	  way	  of	  foregrounding	  these	  points.	  	  
A	  more	  explicitly	  systems-­‐level	  approach	  is	  proposed	  in	  the	  2012	  Manifesto	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
broader	  literature	  on	  deliberative	  systems.	  This	  systemic	  account	  advances	  an	  altogether	  
stronger	  claim,	  namely,	  that	  the	  discursive	  totality	  (including	  everyday	  talk,	  formal	  
deliberation,	  and	  the	  discursive	  context	  in	  which	  all	  of	  these	  forms	  of	  communication	  take	  
place)	  can	  itself	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  system	  of	  deliberation.	  On	  this	  view,	  practices	  that	  are	  not	  
themselves	  deliberative	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  a	  systemic	  perspective	  as	  constitutive	  elements	  of	  
a	  deliberative	  process	  that	  issues	  in	  societal	  decisions	  and	  can	  be	  judged	  by	  the	  kind	  of	  
criteria	  that	  we	  standardly	  apply	  to	  deliberative	  democratic	  practices.	  
	  
Deliberative	  systems	  and	  the	  ideal	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  
Our	  critique	  of	  the	  systemic	  approach	  to	  deliberative	  systems	  is	  that	  this	  turn,	  as	  currently	  
elaborated,	  stands	  in	  a	  relation	  of	  considerable	  tension	  to	  deliberative	  democracy	  as	  a	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political	  ideal.	  We	  offer	  a	  number	  of	  interconnected	  criticisms	  sharing	  a	  common	  concern	  
that,	  with	  the	  systemic	  turn,	  deliberative	  democracy	  threatens	  to	  lose	  its	  normative	  
moorings.	  The	  currently	  dominant	  articulations	  of	  the	  deliberative	  system	  could,	  we	  argue,	  
result	  in	  judging	  a	  system	  as	  deliberative	  with	  little,	  or	  even	  nothing,	  in	  the	  way	  of	  actual	  
democratic	  deliberation	  between	  citizens	  taking	  place.	  This	  would	  be	  an	  ironic	  outcome	  
indeed	  given	  the	  classic	  commitment	  of	  deliberative	  democrats	  to,	  what	  Mansbridge	  calls,	  
‘a	  democratic	  theory	  that	  puts	  the	  citizen	  at	  the	  center’.25	  In	  our	  analysis,	  we	  take	  as	  the	  
core	  justification	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  as	  a	  political	  ideal	  that	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  our	  
collective	  political	  arrangements	  (institutions,	  laws,	  policies)	  rests	  on	  mutual	  justification	  
enacted	  through	  deliberative	  practices	  amongst	  free	  and	  equal	  citizens.	  We	  argue	  that	  this	  
political	  ideal	  is	  easily	  lost	  in	  the	  current	  articulations	  of	  the	  deliberative	  system.	  	  
Our	  analysis	  turns	  primarily	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  deliberative	  systems	  theorists	  consider	  
non-­‐deliberative	  speech	  acts	  and	  practices.	  	  While	  we	  share	  with	  these	  theorists	  the	  insight	  
that	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  be	  attentive	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  non-­‐deliberative	  acts	  and	  practices	  
enable	  or	  disable	  democratic	  deliberation,	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  dominant	  accounts	  of	  the	  
deliberative	  system	  consider	  these	  non-­‐deliberative	  elements	  generates	  significant	  
problems	  that	  places	  proponents	  in	  an	  uncomfortable	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  central	  tenets	  of	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  Mansbridge	  1999,	  p.	  212.	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Deliberative	  Dilemmas	  I	  
What	  Goodin	  and	  Dryzek	  (and	  those	  who	  follow	  their	  approaches)	  share	  is	  a	  desire	  to	  judge	  
the	  deliberative	  system	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  system;	  in	  other	  words,	  to	  apply	  criteria	  drawn	  
from	  the	  theory	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  to	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  Consider,	  first,	  the	  
‘distributed	  deliberation’	  model	  proposed	  by	  Goodin.	  As	  the	  name	  implies,	  this	  approach	  
breaks	  down	  the	  ‘unitary’	  notion	  of	  democratic	  deliberation	  into	  its	  constituent	  elements	  
and	  looks	  at	  the	  ‘distribution’	  of	  these	  elements	  across	  a	  range	  of	  institutions.	  Non-­‐
deliberative	  speech	  acts	  and	  practices	  may	  have	  an	  important	  role	  to	  play	  in	  such	  sequences	  
and,	  indeed,	  may	  be	  constitutive	  of	  the	  overall	  ‘distributed	  deliberative’	  quality	  of	  the	  
system.	  Thompson	  has	  raised	  cogent	  doubts	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  division	  of	  deliberative	  
labour	  assumed	  in	  such	  a	  distributed	  account	  can	  be	  sustained	  and	  effectively	  
coordinated,26	  however,	  our	  particular	  concern	  is	  that	  within	  this	  conception	  of	  a	  
deliberative	  system,	  no	  actual	  deliberation	  between	  citizens	  need	  take	  place	  as	  long	  as	  the	  
process	  embodied	  in	  the	  sequenced	  institutions	  is	  functionally	  equivalent	  to	  a	  deliberative	  
democratic	  exchange.	  	  In	  this	  somewhat	  reductionist	  approach,	  democratic	  deliberation	  is	  
conceived	  instrumentally	  as	  a	  way	  of	  generating	  decisions	  that	  are	  sensitive	  to	  the	  relevant	  
range	  of	  public	  reasons.	  	  Because	  only	  the	  end	  of	  appropriately	  sensitive	  decisions	  matters,	  
any	  functionally	  equivalent	  democratic	  way	  of	  generating	  this	  end	  will	  count	  as	  equally	  
legitimate.	  The	  model	  does	  not	  rule	  out	  the	  inclusion	  of	  deliberative	  institutions	  within	  a	  
sequence,	  but	  does	  not	  require	  their	  inclusion.	  	  
Such	  a	  ‘distributed’	  approach	  to	  deliberative	  systems	  sets	  aside	  any	  concern	  for	  the	  
deliberative	  capacities	  and	  powers	  of	  citizens.	  	  It	  thus	  loses	  sight	  of	  two	  important	  points.	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  Thompson	  2008,	  p.	  514.	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First,	  part	  of	  the	  political	  ideal	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  is	  that	  its	  (normative)	  stability	  is	  
generated	  by	  citizens	  being	  able	  intelligibly	  to	  conceive	  of	  (adopt	  a	  stance	  towards)	  
themselves	  as	  equals	  engaged	  in	  a	  process	  of	  public	  reasoning	  oriented	  to	  a	  shared	  practical	  
judgment,	  where	  such	  a	  process	  involves	  citizens	  reflectively	  taking	  up	  each	  other’s	  
standpoints.	  Second,	  part	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  actual	  (unitary)	  deliberation	  as	  a	  practice	  of	  
public	  reasoning	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  creative	  process	  in	  which	  novel	  shared	  reasons	  can	  emerge	  
within	  the	  activity	  of	  reasoning	  together	  as	  equals.	  The	  reasons	  to	  which	  rule	  is	  responsive	  
are	  liable	  to	  be	  process-­‐dependent	  and	  bound	  to	  whether	  citizens	  in	  such	  a	  process	  can	  
conceive	  of	  themselves	  as	  reasoning	  together	  as	  equals.	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  a	  
‘distributed	  deliberation’	  process	  would	  track	  this	  aspect	  of	  unitary	  deliberation.	  The	  
difference	  is	  between	  ‘we,	  together’	  (unitary	  deliberation)	  and	  ‘we,	  all’	  (distributed	  
deliberation)	  –	  a	  difference	  that	  might	  be	  glossed	  in	  terms	  of	  Rousseau’s	  distinction	  
between	  the	  general	  will	  and	  the	  will	  of	  all.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  we	  have	  reason	  to	  be	  sceptical	  
of	  the	  claim	  of	  functional	  equivalence	  that	  a	  ‘distributed’	  process	  of	  the	  kind	  envisaged	  by	  
Goodin	  simply	  assumes.	  In	  this	  respect,	  although	  the	  ‘distributed	  deliberation’	  approach	  
may	  be	  a	  cogent	  piece	  of	  institutional	  design	  for	  a	  democratic	  system,	  it	  has	  a	  problematic	  
relation	  to	  deliberative	  democracy	  as	  a	  political	  ideal.	  It	  essentially	  presupposes	  (perhaps	  on	  
Humean	  grounds)	  that	  ‘reasoning	  together’	  is	  not	  realistically	  attainable	  and	  is	  offered	  as	  a	  
‘second	  best’	  response	  to	  this	  condition.	  
Compare	  Goodin’s	  distributed	  deliberation	  model	  with	  Parkinson’s	  account	  of	  the	  different	  
decision	  stages	  of	  a	  deliberative	  system.	  Parkinson	  appears	  to	  be	  following	  Goodin’s	  focus	  
on	  system-­‐level	  analysis,	  with	  the	  timing	  and	  sequencing	  of	  the	  contributions	  of	  different	  
actors	  being	  critical	  in	  judging	  deliberative	  quality.	  However,	  he	  argues:	  ‘it	  would	  be	  a	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strange	  deliberative	  system	  indeed	  if	  none	  of	  its	  elements	  met	  deliberative	  democratic	  
criteria.’27	  Goodin’s	  ‘deliberative	  Schumpeterianism’	  sequence28	  is	  one	  such	  ‘strange	  
deliberative	  system’.	  What	  distinguishes	  Parkinson’s	  account,	  therefore,	  is	  his	  incorporation	  
of	  civic	  practices	  of	  reasoning	  together	  within	  the	  sequential	  system.29	  
If	  Goodin	  represents	  one	  variant	  of	  systems-­‐level	  analysis	  in	  deliberative	  systems	  theory,	  
then	  those	  inspired	  by	  a	  more	  Habermasian	  model	  offer	  a	  second	  approach.	  In	  its	  simplest	  
formulation	  the	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  full	  range	  of	  discourses	  are	  present	  within	  (using	  Dryzek’s	  
language)	  public	  space	  and	  that	  the	  deliberative	  quality	  of	  the	  system	  rests	  on	  the	  inclusion	  
and	  reflection	  of	  these	  discourses	  in	  empowered	  space	  where	  political	  decisions	  are	  
enacted.	  Parkinson	  offers	  a	  succinct	  characterisation	  of	  this	  type	  of	  approach:	  	  
A	  system	  with	  a	  division	  of	  labor	  is	  deliberative	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  increases	  the	  
pool	  of	  perspectives,	  claims,	  narratives,	  and	  reasons	  available	  to	  decision	  makers,	  
and	  whether	  those	  perspectives	  are	  generated	  deliberatively	  or	  not	  is	  neither	  here	  
nor	  there	  so	  long	  as	  the	  decision-­‐makers’	  processes	  themselves	  are	  deliberative.30	  	  
This	  position	  shares	  Goodin’s	  commitment	  to	  a	  systemic	  locus	  for	  judgments	  of	  deliberative	  
democracy	  but	  introduces	  deliberation,	  in	  the	  ‘unitary’	  sense,	  in	  the	  final	  decision-­‐making	  
processes.	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  seems	  prima	  facie	  to	  cohere	  with	  deliberative	  democracy	  as	  a	  
political	  ideal.	  The	  ideal	  of	  unitary	  empowered	  space	  in	  which	  all	  perspectives	  are	  present	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Parkinson	  2006,	  p.	  7.	  
28	  Goodin	  2005,	  p.	  202	  
29	  Parkinson,	  2006,	  p.166-­‐173.	  
30	  Parkinson	  2012,	  p.	  154.	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resonates	  with	  Dryzek	  and	  Simon	  Niemeyer’s	  idea	  of	  a	  ‘chamber	  of	  discourses’31	  as	  well	  as	  
Bohman’s	  argument	  for	  the	  insertion	  of	  mini-­‐demoi	  within	  systems	  of	  trans-­‐national	  
governance.32	  	  
In	  this	  type	  of	  approach,	  there	  are	  two	  criteria	  governing	  the	  comparative	  evaluation	  of	  
deliberative	  systems:	  (a)	  the	  quality	  of	  deliberation	  amongst	  decision-­‐makers	  which	  is,	  in	  
part,	  dependent	  on	  (b)	  the	  quantity	  of	  ‘perspectives,	  claims,	  narratives,	  and	  reasons’	  that	  
the	  system	  makes	  available	  for	  their	  consideration.	  There	  are	  two	  immediate	  problems	  with	  
this	  view.	  
The	  first	  problem	  is	  that	  it	  treats	  ‘perspectives,	  claims,	  narratives,	  and	  reasons’	  as	  if	  these	  
were	  given,	  independent	  of	  political	  structures,	  simply	  waiting	  to	  be	  uncovered.	  	  The	  
plurality	  of	  perspectives,	  claims,	  narratives,	  and	  reasons	  that	  characterise	  a	  political	  society	  
cannot	  however	  plausibly	  be	  construed	  as	  independent	  of	  the	  social	  and	  political	  
institutions	  and	  practices	  of	  that	  society.	  Imagine	  an	  institutional	  reform	  that	  generates	  
more	  perspectives,	  claims,	  narratives,	  and	  reasons	  for	  the	  decision-­‐making	  body	  to	  
consider.	  On	  this	  view,	  it	  follows	  that	  this	  reform	  has	  necessarily	  improved	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  
deliberative	  system,	  whereas	  it	  may	  simply	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  reform	  has	  further	  
fragmented	  and/or	  polarised	  political	  society.	  
A	  second	  and	  related	  problem	  is	  that	  many	  crucial	  features	  of	  a	  political	  system	  depend	  on	  
the	  capacity	  of	  citizens	  to	  deliberate	  to	  produce	  the	  perspectives,	  claims,	  narratives	  and	  
reasons	  on	  which	  the	  decision-­‐makers	  depend,	  the	  capacity	  of	  citizens	  to	  (s)elect	  good	  
decision-­‐makers,	  and	  the	  capacity	  of	  those	  decision-­‐makers	  to	  deliberate	  cogently.	  These	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Dryzek	  2010,	  pp.	  42-­‐65.	  
32	  Bohman	  2012,	  p.	  87.	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capacities	  themselves	  depend	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  deliberation	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  political	  
society	  outside	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  body.	  By	  simply	  eliding	  this	  point,	  this	  approach	  
renders	  itself	  unable	  to	  address	  a	  central	  issue	  for	  any	  deliberative	  system:	  that	  of	  the	  
production	  and	  distribution	  of	  deliberative	  capacities.	  Both	  of	  these	  problems	  might	  be	  
overcome	  if	  we	  turn	  to	  Dryzek’s	  recent	  influential	  accounts	  of	  the	  deliberative	  system,	  
which	  share	  a	  similar	  Habermasian	  distinction	  between	  opinion	  formation	  in	  the	  informal	  
public	  sphere	  and	  will-­‐formation	  in	  formal	  institutions.	  However,	  a	  more	  fundamental	  
problem	  remains:	  the	  question	  of	  the	  evaluation	  of	  non-­‐deliberative	  acts	  and	  practices.	  
Dryzek	  is	  explicit	  that	  in	  his	  model	  of	  the	  deliberative	  system,	  ‘the	  systemic	  test	  should	  take	  
priority’.33	  One	  of	  the	  attractions	  of	  the	  systemic	  turn	  is	  that	  it	  promises	  to	  develop	  the	  
entirely	  plausible	  claim	  that	  non-­‐deliberative	  speech	  acts	  and	  practices	  may	  well	  have	  
positive	  systemic	  properties:	  ‘taking	  a	  systems	  perspective	  means	  that	  we	  should	  be	  alive	  to	  
the	  possibility	  that	  intrinsically	  non-­‐deliberative	  acts	  or	  practices	  may	  have	  consequences	  
that	  are	  positive	  for	  the	  deliberative	  qualities	  of	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole’.34	  As	  such	  this	  
position	  foregrounds	  the	  function	  of	  any	  communicative	  input	  in	  considering	  systematic	  
deliberative	  properties.	  Dryzek	  makes	  this	  point	  clear.	  In	  discussing	  the	  often	  extreme	  
rhetoric	  of	  the	  populist	  Australian	  politician	  Pauline	  Hanson	  (and	  in	  a	  similar	  vein,	  the	  
sectarian	  rhetoric	  in	  the	  lead-­‐up	  to	  the	  1998	  Good	  Friday	  agreement	  in	  Northern	  Ireland),	  
Dryzek	  distinguishes	  between	  the	  intent	  and	  the	  systemic	  effects	  of	  Hanson’s	  rhetoric:	  
She	  has	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  commitment	  to	  any	  categorical	  deliberative	  norms,	  and	  
was	  not	  averse	  to	  racial	  stereotyping.	  Yet	  the	  net	  result	  of	  her	  activities	  was	  a	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Dryzek	  2010,	  p.	  82.	  
34	  Stevenson	  and	  Dryzek	  2014,	  pp.	  32-­‐33;	  see	  also	  Dryzek	  2011,	  pp.	  226-­‐7.	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deliberative	  polity,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  a	  number	  of	  discourses	  that	  were	  either	  
taken	  for	  granted	  or	  had	  yet	  to	  crystallize	  or	  had	  been	  marginalized	  took	  shape	  in	  a	  
way	  that	  could	  have	  allowed	  for	  their	  engagement	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  (though	  the	  
actual	  interchange	  that	  occurred	  was	  not	  always	  salutary).	  The	  general	  point	  here	  is	  
that	  we	  cannot	  read	  off	  the	  systemic	  effects	  of	  rhetoric	  from	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  
speaker.35	  	  
The	  prevalence	  of	  non-­‐deliberative	  speech	  acts	  of	  the	  type	  exemplified	  by	  Hanson	  is	  likely	  
to	  be	  symptomatic	  of	  deliberative	  failures,	  that	  is,	  of	  a	  constituency	  who	  feel	  excluded	  from	  
the	  democratic	  system	  –	  and	  this	  has	  functional	  value.	  However	  the	  claim	  being	  advanced	  
by	  deliberative	  systems	  theorists	  is	  the	  stronger	  one	  that	  such	  non-­‐deliberative	  acts,	  
independent	  of	  their	  symptomatic	  value,	  can	  improve	  the	  overall	  quality	  of	  the	  deliberative	  
system.36	  	  The	  key	  feature	  of	  a	  deliberative	  system	  for	  Dryzek	  then	  is	  that	  the	  full	  range	  of	  
discourses	  emerge	  within	  public	  space	  and	  are	  considered	  within	  empowered	  spaces	  with	  
decisional	  effect.37	  	  
Although	  such	  a	  systems-­‐level	  account	  is	  one	  logical	  response	  to	  the	  question	  of	  evaluating	  
deliberative	  systems,	  the	  dilemma	  is	  that	  it	  all	  too	  easily	  becomes	  a	  functional	  defence	  of	  
non-­‐deliberative	  acts	  and	  practices	  that	  does	  not	  cohere	  with	  even	  the	  minimal	  
requirements	  of	  mutual	  respect	  that	  all	  theorists	  consider	  central	  to	  deliberation	  per	  se.	  As	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Dryzek	  2010,	  p.	  82.	  See	  also	  Bohman	  2012,	  p.85.	  
36	  We	  thank	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  pressing	  us	  on	  this	  issue.	  
37	  There	  is	  a	  degree	  of	  ambiguity	  in	  Dryzek’s	  work	  about	  whether	  he	  is	  concerned	  about	  how	  those	  discourses	  
emerge.	  If	  he	  is	  serious	  about	  a	  systems	  level	  evaluation,	  then	  this	  may	  be	  of	  little	  concern	  and	  all	  that	  is	  
important	  is	  that	  the	  full	  variety	  of	  discourses	  are	  present	  and	  considered	  within	  the	  system.	  However,	  
occasionally	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  deliberative	  quality	  of	  the	  parts	  is	  of	  concern.	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in	  the	  case	  of	  Pauline	  Hanson,	  the	  acts	  defended	  by	  deliberative	  democrats	  may	  involve	  
epistemic	  or	  hermeneutic	  injustice38	  that	  encourage	  or	  reproduce	  the	  marginalisation	  or	  
oppression	  of	  vulnerable	  groups.	  To	  avoid	  such	  an	  implication,	  Dryzek,39	  following	  
Thompson,	  appeals	  to	  ‘meta-­‐deliberative’	  justifications	  of	  non-­‐deliberative	  practices.	  We	  
should	  ‘not	  insist	  that	  every	  practice	  in	  a	  deliberative	  democracy	  be	  deliberative,	  but	  that	  
every	  practice	  should	  at	  some	  point	  in	  time	  be	  deliberatively	  justified’.40	  The	  challenge,	  
however,	  is	  how	  such	  meta-­‐deliberation	  is	  to	  be	  established	  and	  sustained:	  Dryzek	  
recognizes	  that	  such	  ‘deep	  and	  widespread	  reflection	  and	  debate	  about	  the	  character	  of	  the	  
system’	  are	  rare	  moments	  and	  typically	  relate	  to	  constitutional	  crisis.41	  How	  then	  to	  justify	  
more	  ‘mundane’	  non-­‐deliberative	  acts	  remains	  unclear.	  But	  the	  requirement	  appropriately	  
poses	  the	  question	  of	  how	  system	  and	  parts	  are	  to	  be	  judged	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  other.	  
Certainly	  in	  his	  more	  recent	  work,	  Dryzek	  is	  aware	  of	  this	  problem.	  As	  Stevenson	  and	  Dryzek	  
argue:	  
This	  need	  to	  keep	  an	  eye	  on	  the	  system	  as	  whole	  when	  evaluating	  practices	  means	  
sometimes	  forgiving	  non-­‐deliberative	  actions.	  It	  therefore	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  too	  
forgiving,	  by	  making	  too	  much	  that	  is	  non-­‐deliberative	  seem	  functional	  for	  the	  
system	  as	  a	  whole…	  The	  general	  analytical	  point	  here	  is	  that	  we	  should	  not	  leap	  too	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Fricker	  2007.	  
39	  Dryzek	  2010,	  p.	  12;	  2011,	  pp.	  226-­‐7.	  
40	  Thompson	  2008,	  p.	  515.	  	  
41	  Dryzek	  2010,	  p.	  12;	  Stevenson	  and	  Dryzek	  2014,	  p.	  29.	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soon	  to	  find	  positive	  deliberative	  consequences	  in	  intrinsically	  non-­‐deliberative	  
practices.42	  	  
One	  reasonable-­‐looking	  response	  to	  this	  problem	  offered	  by	  Dryzek	  is	  ‘deliberative	  capacity	  
building’.43	  However	  since	  the	  criterion	  that	  meta-­‐deliberators	  must	  apply	  is	  that	  of	  the	  
‘deliberative	  capacity’	  of	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole,	  this	  way	  of	  framing	  the	  question	  ignores	  
the	  distribution	  of	  deliberative	  capacities	  across	  the	  diverse	  actors	  who	  compose	  the	  
deliberative	  system,	  at	  least	  beyond	  the	  minimal	  requirement	  that	  all	  discourses	  should	  be	  
represented	  (Note	  again	  the	  presumption	  that	  discourses	  are	  given,	  waiting	  to	  be	  
represented).	  Such	  a	  systemic	  approach	  is	  compatible	  with	  highly	  unequal	  distributions	  of	  
deliberative	  capacity	  across	  the	  demos.	  One	  deliberative	  system	  will	  count	  as	  better	  than	  
another	  if	  it	  exhibits	  greater	  deliberative	  capacity	  in	  sum,	  even	  if	  the	  creation	  of	  such	  
greater	  capacity	  involves	  a	  more	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  deliberative	  capacity	  across	  the	  
relevant	  actors.	  This	  neglect	  of	  what	  can	  be	  termed	  ‘deliberative	  equality’	  is	  hard	  to	  square	  
with	  the	  requirement	  that	  the	  subjects	  of	  a	  deliberative	  democracy	  can	  coherently	  
represent	  themselves	  to	  each	  other	  as	  the	  equal	  co-­‐authors	  of	  the	  rule	  to	  which	  they	  are	  
subject.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  problem	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  analogue	  of	  Rawls’	  objection	  to	  
utilitarianism,	  namely,	  it	  does	  not	  take	  the	  distinction	  between	  persons	  seriously.44	  
We	  can	  summarise	  our	  objection	  briefly.	  In	  embracing	  the	  function	  of	  non-­‐deliberative	  
communicative	  acts,	  deliberative	  systems	  theorists	  often	  fail	  to	  recognise	  and	  account	  for	  
the	  deliberative	  wrongs	  that	  such	  acts	  involve	  and	  the	  harm	  that	  they	  frequently	  cause.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  Stevenson	  and	  Dryzek	  2014,	  p.	  33.	  
43	  Dryzek	  2010.	  
44	  See	  Laden	  2004.	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Pauline	  Hanson’s	  populist	  rhetoric,	  for	  example,	  was	  regularly	  racist,	  often	  targeting	  
particularly	  vulnerable	  social	  groups.	  Recognising	  the	  deliberative	  function	  of	  this	  rhetoric	  in	  
opening	  up	  the	  public	  sphere	  requires	  overlooking,	  or	  trading	  off,	  a	  deliberative	  wrong	  that	  
both	  instrumentally	  and	  constitutively	  undermines	  the	  standing	  of	  these	  targets	  as	  free	  and	  
equal	  members	  of	  the	  democratic	  polity.	  Thus	  in	  defending	  the	  ‘systemic’	  deliberative	  
function	  of	  non-­‐deliberative	  speech	  acts,	  deliberative	  systems	  theorists	  face	  the	  real	  danger	  
of	  treating	  certain	  subjects	  as	  means	  to	  ‘deliberative’	  ends.	  The	  appeal	  to	  meta-­‐deliberation	  
invoked	  to	  address	  this	  problem	  simply	  reproduces	  the	  neglect	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  
persons	  that	  the	  initial	  problem	  exhibits.	  For	  a	  theory	  that	  rests	  on	  ideals	  of	  autonomy	  and	  
mutual	  respect	  for	  the	  subject,	  such	  conclusions	  are	  uncomfortable	  at	  best.	  There	  may	  be	  
democratic	  justifications	  for	  such	  acts	  and	  practices,	  but	  the	  onus	  of	  justification	  is	  on	  
deliberative	  democrats	  to	  offer	  an	  account	  of	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  these	  can	  be	  
deliberative	  democratic	  justifications.	  
	  	  
Deliberative	  dilemmas	  II	  
The	  authors	  of	  the	  Manifesto	  follow	  the	  systems-­‐level	  theorists	  in	  recognising	  the	  way	  in	  
which	  non-­‐deliberative	  acts	  and	  practices	  may	  strengthen	  the	  overall	  deliberative	  quality	  of	  
the	  system:	  
A	  systemic	  approach	  allows	  us	  to	  analyze	  the	  division	  of	  labor	  among	  parts	  of	  the	  
system,	  each	  with	  its	  different	  deliberative	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses,	  and	  to	  
conclude	  that	  a	  single	  part,	  which	  in	  itself	  may	  have	  low	  or	  even	  negative	  
deliberative	  quality	  with	  respect	  to	  one	  of	  several	  deliberative	  ideals,	  may	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nevertheless	  make	  an	  important	  contribution	  to	  an	  overall	  deliberative	  system.	  For	  
example,	  highly	  partisan	  rhetoric,	  even	  while	  violating	  some	  deliberative	  ideals,	  may	  
nonetheless	  help	  to	  fulfill	  other	  deliberative	  ideals	  such	  as	  inclusion.45	  	  
However,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  they	  are	  chary	  of	  an	  approach	  to	  evaluation	  of	  deliberative	  systems	  
conducted	  solely	  at	  the	  systemic	  level,	  arguing	  for	  a	  synthesis	  of	  judgments	  of	  whole	  and	  
parts:46	  
Normatively,	  a	  systemic	  approach	  means	  that	  the	  system	  should	  be	  judged	  as	  a	  
whole	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  parts	  being	  judged	  independently.	  We	  need	  to	  ask	  not	  only	  
what	  good	  deliberation	  would	  be	  both	  in	  general	  and	  in	  particular	  settings,	  but	  also	  
what	  a	  good	  deliberative	  system	  would	  entail.47	  	  
Like	  the	  systemic	  accounts	  that	  we	  have	  already	  encountered,	  the	  Manifesto	  authors	  
consider	  the	  way	  in	  which	  a	  communicative	  input	  that	  in	  its	  own	  terms	  is	  difficult	  to	  justify	  
from	  a	  deliberative	  perspective	  –	  for	  example	  highly	  partisan	  media	  and	  rhetoric	  –	  may	  well	  
help	  realise	  particular	  deliberative	  qualities	  when	  considered	  in	  systemic	  terms.	  However,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Mansbridge	  et	  al.	  2012,	  pp.	  2-­‐3.	  
46	  In	  this	  analysis,	  we	  put	  to	  one	  side	  a	  series	  of	  problems	  related	  to	  the	  specification	  of	  systems	  (simply,	  what	  
is	  in	  and	  what	  is	  out)	  and	  the	  potential	  interactions	  between	  different	  systems	  (Young	  2007;	  Owen	  2010).	  The	  
Manifesto’s	  desire	  to	  define	  the	  system	  in	  terms	  of	  either	  institutions	  or	  issues	  generates	  little	  analytical	  clarity	  
as	  to	  how	  far	  deliberative	  systems	  extend	  or	  their	  potential	  interaction	  with	  other	  systems	  (e.g.	  legal,	  
economic,	  or	  kinship	  systems).	  The	  same	  is	  true	  of	  identifying	  what	  is	  a	  ‘part’	  and	  how	  this	  interacts	  with	  the	  
system(s).	  	  
47	  Mansbridge	  et	  al.	  2012,	  pp.	  4-­‐5,	  our	  emphasis.	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they	  recognise	  the	  dangers	  implicit	  in	  focusing	  too	  heavily	  on	  the	  function	  of	  communicative	  
acts	  at	  the	  systemic	  level	  alone:	  
A	  systemic	  analysis	  must	  be	  able	  to	  make	  judgments	  and	  must	  have	  the	  analytic	  
tools	  to	  do	  so.	  Without	  criteria	  to	  evaluate	  when	  non-­‐deliberative,	  weakly	  
deliberative,	  or	  even	  anti-­‐deliberative	  behaviour	  nevertheless	  enhances	  the	  
deliberative	  system,	  one	  risks	  falling	  into	  the	  blind	  spot	  of	  old	  style	  functionalism:	  
everything	  can	  be	  seen	  as,	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another,	  contributing	  to	  the	  system.48	  
The	  authors	  make	  this	  point	  in	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  potential	  systemic	  contribution	  of	  ‘certain	  
disruptive	  and	  only	  weakly	  civil	  Radical	  Left	  or	  Tea	  Party	  protests…	  if	  they	  can	  be	  reasonably	  
understood	  as	  giving	  voice	  to	  a	  minority	  opinion	  long	  ignored	  in	  the	  public	  sphere,	  or	  in	  
bringing	  more	  and	  better	  important	  information	  into	  the	  public	  arena’.49	  They	  continue:	  ‘In	  
this	  analysis	  much	  would	  depend	  on	  a	  combination	  of	  empirical	  and	  conceptual-­‐analytic	  
findings	  regarding	  the	  short-­‐run	  and	  long-­‐run	  inequalities	  redressed	  by	  the	  protesters	  and	  
the	  short-­‐run	  and	  long-­‐run	  chilling	  effects	  of	  their	  actions	  upon	  deliberation’.50	  
Three	  criteria	  are	  sketched	  to	  guide	  judgments	  of	  the	  deliberative	  system:	  its	  ‘epistemic,	  
ethical,	  and	  democratic	  functions’.51	  Just	  as	  Mansbridge	  argued	  should	  be	  the	  case	  for	  the	  
analysis	  of	  everyday	  talk	  in	  her	  earlier	  1999	  essay,	  the	  criteria	  for	  analysing	  the	  deliberative	  
system	  are	  here	  modified	  and	  loosened.	  They	  are	  far	  weaker	  than	  the	  standards	  usually	  
articulated	  within	  theories	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  and,	  as	  they	  currently	  stand,	  these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Ibid.,	  p.	  19.	  
49	  Ibid.	  
50	  Ibid.	  
51	  Ibid.,	  p.	  11.	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criteria	  give	  us	  little	  purchase	  in	  guiding	  our	  judgments	  on	  either	  the	  justification	  of	  non-­‐
deliberative	  speech	  acts	  and	  practices	  or	  the	  relative	  weight	  to	  give	  these	  particular	  acts	  
and	  practices	  as	  against	  the	  deliberative	  system	  as	  a	  whole.52	  	  
In	  this	  essay	  it	  is	  not	  our	  intention	  to	  develop	  such	  criteria	  and	  standards.	  We	  suggest	  only	  
that	  theorists	  who	  take	  a	  systemic	  approach	  to	  the	  deliberative	  system	  have	  much	  more	  
work	  to	  do	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  an	  analytical	  framework	  within	  which	  the	  justification	  of	  the	  
inclusion	  of	  non-­‐deliberative	  speech	  acts	  and	  practices	  can	  be	  addressed.	  It	  is	  always	  
possible	  to	  point	  to	  ways	  in	  which	  non-­‐deliberative	  communicative	  acts	  are,	  or	  can	  be,	  
precursors	  to	  more	  deliberative	  conditions.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  much	  of	  the	  discussion	  within	  
the	  deliberative	  systems	  literature	  draws	  on	  apparently	  counter-­‐intuitive	  examples	  of	  the	  
contributions	  of	  unreasonable	  rhetoric,	  partisan	  media,	  disruptive	  activities	  and	  the	  like,	  
stressing	  (rightly)	  that	  systemic	  effects	  cannot	  simply	  be	  read	  off	  from	  the	  actor’s	  intentions.	  
Although	  we	  agree	  with	  this	  larger	  point,	  we	  argue	  that	  proponents	  of	  the	  systemic	  
approach	  need	  not	  only	  to	  provide	  evidence	  that	  any	  particular	  non-­‐deliberative	  speech	  act	  
is	  to	  be	  preferred	  to	  speech	  acts	  that	  that	  have	  more	  deliberative	  qualities	  (simply	  indicating	  
that	  non-­‐deliberative	  acts	  can	  play	  a	  causal	  role	  in	  generating	  functionally	  beneficial	  
deliberative	  effects	  is	  hardly	  sufficient),	  but	  also	  to	  develop	  appropriate	  normative	  criteria	  
for	  determining	  when	  deviations	  from	  deliberative	  norms	  are	  legitimate.	  	  
In	  some	  situations	  non-­‐deliberative	  acts	  and	  practices	  may	  be	  justified	  from	  a	  deliberative	  
perspective.	  For	  example,	  Fung	  cogently	  argues	  that	  unreasonable	  acts	  by	  the	  oppressed	  
and	  disenfranchised	  can	  be	  justified	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  current	  political	  circumstances	  are	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  This	  objection	  was	  raised	  by	  Gutmann	  and	  Thompson	  (1999,	  p.	  274)	  in	  their	  response	  to	  Mansbridge’s	  1999	  
essay	  and	  remains	  salient.	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characterised	  by	  material	  and	  political	  inequality	  and	  failures	  of	  reciprocity.	  	  Indeed,	  ‘the	  
extent	  of	  permissible	  deviation	  from	  deliberative	  norms	  increases	  according	  to	  the	  adversity	  
of	  political	  circumstances’.53	  Fung’s	  argument	  is	  explicitly	  driven	  by	  the	  normative	  ideal	  of	  
deliberative	  democracy;	  it	  asks	  what	  deviations	  from	  deliberative	  norms	  can	  be	  justified	  in	  
terms	  of	  the	  deliberative	  democratic	  ideal	  given	  current	  non-­‐ideal	  conditions.	  This	  form	  of	  
meta-­‐deliberative	  justification	  provides	  an	  example	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  criteria	  that	  systemic	  
theorists	  need	  to	  develop	  if	  their	  project	  is	  not	  to	  collapse	  into	  what	  they	  acknowledge	  as	  
the	  incoherencies	  of	  ‘old	  style	  functionalism’.54	  
For	  the	  reasons	  given	  above,	  we	  contend	  that	  it	  is	  important	  how	  perspectives	  are	  
generated.	  	  Thus,	  deliberative	  systems	  theorists	  need	  show	  why	  non-­‐deliberative	  processes	  
are	  to	  be	  favoured	  over	  potentially	  deliberative	  ones	  with	  an	  account	  that	  does	  not	  conduct	  
its	  evaluation	  only	  at	  the	  systemic	  level.	  Any	  such	  account	  should	  indicate	  how	  to	  evaluate	  
the	  trade-­‐off	  between	  the	  deliberative	  quality	  of	  the	  parts	  and	  of	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  
do	  so	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  deliberative	  democratic	  ideal.	  	  It	  should	  suggest	  ways	  of	  assessing	  
both	  the	  value	  of	  non-­‐deliberative	  practices	  and	  any	  deliberative	  wrongs	  they	  may	  involve.	  
It	  should,	  in	  particular,	  consider	  potential	  deliberative	  alternatives	  to	  any	  practices	  that	  
involve	  deliberative	  wrongs.	  	  
One	  possible	  way	  of	  addressing	  these	  concerns	  is	  to	  argue	  that,	  barring	  circumstances	  of	  the	  
type	  highlighted	  by	  Fung,	  any	  component	  part	  of	  a	  deliberative	  system	  should	  achieve	  a	  
‘deliberative	  minimum’.	  The	  Manifesto	  provides	  some	  indication	  of	  such	  an	  idea	  in	  the	  way	  
in	  which	  it	  briefly	  treats	  mutual	  respect	  as	  part	  of	  the	  ‘ethical’	  criteria	  for	  judging	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Fung	  2005,	  p.	  397;	  see	  also	  Bächtiger	  et	  al.	  2010,	  p.	  59.	  
54	  Mansbridge	  et	  al.	  2012,	  p.	  19.	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deliberative	  system.	  	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  occasions	  in	  which	  these	  criteria	  for	  judgment	  
refer	  to	  a	  ‘thicker’	  conception	  of	  deliberation:	  
We	  stress	  mutual	  respect,	  however,	  because	  even	  more	  than	  other	  ethical	  
considerations,	  it	  is	  intrinsically	  a	  part	  of	  deliberation.	  To	  deliberate	  with	  another	  is	  
to	  understand	  the	  other	  as	  a	  self-­‐authoring	  source	  of	  reasons	  and	  claims.	  To	  fail	  to	  
grant	  to	  another	  the	  moral	  status	  of	  authorship	  is,	  in	  effect,	  to	  remove	  oneself	  from	  
the	  possibility	  of	  deliberative	  influence.	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  being	  open	  to	  being	  
moved	  by	  the	  words	  of	  another	  is	  to	  respect	  the	  other	  as	  a	  source	  of	  reasons,	  claims	  
and	  perspectives.55	  
This	  crucial	  point	  expresses	  the	  core	  of	  the	  objection	  we	  have	  to	  evaluation	  solely	  at	  the	  
systemic	  level.	  However,	  the	  Manifesto	  leaves	  it	  unclear	  what	  this	  stress	  on	  the	  importance	  
of	  mutual	  respect	  could	  amount	  to	  given	  the	  types	  of	  activities	  –	  e.g.	  forms	  of	  highly	  
partisan	  media	  and	  protest	  –	  that	  the	  authors	  are	  willing	  to	  include	  within	  their	  discussion	  
of	  the	  deliberative	  system.	  Any	  account	  of	  mutual	  respect	  compatible	  with,	  for	  example,	  the	  
radical	  populist	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  Tea	  Party	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  so	  thin	  as	  to	  be	  negligible.	  However,	  if	  
we	  drop	  the	  ‘deliberative	  minimum’	  and	  consider	  ‘mutual	  respect’	  solely	  at	  the	  systemic	  
level,	  then	  it	  is	  entirely	  plausible	  that	  one	  system	  may	  exhibit	  greater	  overall	  mutual	  respect	  
than	  another	  while	  also	  exhibiting	  a	  greater	  lack	  of	  respect	  in	  regard	  to	  a	  specific	  group.	  
Either	  an	  appeal	  to	  mutual	  respect	  disavows	  such	  rhetoric	  (a	  deliberative	  minimum	  is	  in	  
place	  except	  under	  the	  kinds	  of	  circumstance	  specified	  by	  Fung)	  or	  a	  systemic	  approach	  
aims	  to	  increase	  the	  overall	  level	  of	  mutual	  respect	  in	  the	  system	  even	  if	  this	  is	  maximised	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  Ibid.,	  p.	  11.	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through	  active	  disrespect	  to	  certain	  groups	  of	  subjects	  within	  the	  polity	  (empirically,	  often	  
the	  most	  vulnerable).	  
A	  final	  uncomfortable	  conclusion	  emerges	  from	  these	  considerations	  of	  the	  deliberative	  
system.	  	  As	  we	  pointed	  out	  earlier,	  it	  might	  be	  possible	  to	  imagine	  a	  deliberative	  system	  –	  
one	  that	  realises	  the	  generally	  weak	  criteria	  offered	  by	  Mansbridge	  et	  al.	  –	  without	  any	  
actual	  democratic	  deliberation	  between	  citizens	  taking	  place.	  We	  can	  certainly	  see	  this	  in	  
the	  sequence	  of	  institutions	  offered	  by	  Goodin,	  a	  model	  that	  he	  ‘semi-­‐provocatively	  dubbed	  
“deliberative	  Schumpeterianism”’.56	  The	  only	  role	  for	  citizens	  in	  his	  schematic	  sequence	  of	  
the	  institutions	  of	  representative	  democracy	  relates	  to	  voting	  in	  the	  election	  campaign	  in	  
which	  competing	  party	  platforms	  are	  presented.	  Deliberation	  occurs	  only	  between	  elite	  
actors.	  Similarly,	  the	  type	  of	  account	  offered	  by	  Dryzek	  and	  Bohman	  pays	  little	  attention	  to	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  perspectives	  emerge	  from	  public	  space,	  and	  deliberation	  in	  empowered	  
space	  may	  be	  some	  distance	  from	  citizens.	  In	  her	  contribution	  to	  the	  Deliberative	  Systems	  
volume,	  Chambers	  focuses	  on	  the	  potential	  of	  social	  science	  surveys	  of	  public	  opinion	  to	  
enable	  mass	  democracy.57	  Commenting	  on	  this	  idea	  in	  his	  conclusion	  to	  the	  collection,	  
Parkinson	  notes	  that	  it	  ‘would	  be	  ironic	  indeed’	  if	  we	  could	  imagine	  a	  deliberative	  system	  in	  
which	  public	  participation	  were	  generally	  passive.58	  Yet	  this	  possibility	  remains	  live	  given	  the	  
manner	  in	  which	  the	  deliberative	  system	  is	  typically	  articulated.	  Our	  critique	  is	  continuous	  
with	  the	  concern	  of	  André	  Bächtiger	  and	  colleagues	  that	  in	  loosening	  the	  account	  of	  
deliberation,	  ‘One	  danger	  is	  that	  almost	  every	  communicative	  act	  may	  qualify	  as	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  Goodin	  2005,	  p.	  202.	  	  
57	  Chambers	  2012.	  
58	  Parkinson	  2012,	  pp.	  151-­‐2.	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‘deliberative’	  (at	  least	  in	  function),	  leading	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  concept	  stretching’59	  and	  
conceptual	  confusion	  between	  deliberative	  and	  non-­‐deliberative	  speech	  acts	  and	  practices.	  
However,	  it	  goes	  considerably	  further	  in	  drawing	  attention	  to	  the	  normative	  costs	  that	  
currently	  accompany	  the	  systemic	  approach	  and	  its	  unmooring	  from	  the	  ideal	  of	  
deliberative	  democracy.	  	  
On	  the	  one	  hand,	  our	  analysis	  has	  exposed	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  conceptualisations	  of	  
deliberative	  systems	  that	  dominate	  current	  debates	  within	  deliberative	  scholarship.	  It	  may	  
be	  that	  theorists	  of	  deliberative	  systems	  are	  able	  to	  counter	  these	  concerns,	  offering	  more	  
suitable	  and	  robust	  criteria	  for	  judging	  deliberative	  quality	  at	  the	  systemic	  level	  that	  deal	  
more	  adequately	  with	  non-­‐deliberative	  acts	  and	  practices.	  This	  is	  a	  relatively	  young	  
theoretical	  enterprise:	  time	  may	  lead	  to	  the	  generation	  of	  more	  theoretically	  robust	  
accounts.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  precisely	  because	  this	  is	  a	  relatively	  new	  theoretical	  
endeavour,	  it	  is	  valuable	  to	  sketch	  systemic	  alternatives	  that	  offer	  significant	  contrasts	  to	  
existing	  formulations	  such	  as	  those	  we	  have	  reviewed	  thus	  far.	  We	  offer	  two	  such	  
alternatives.	  The	  first	  remains	  within	  the	  normative	  framework	  of	  deliberative	  democracy,	  
while	  the	  second	  poses	  a	  more	  radical	  challenge	  to	  the	  articulation	  of	  democratic	  ideals	  
such	  as	  deliberative	  democracy	  and	  proposes	  that	  thinking	  through	  the	  systemic	  turn	  may	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Bächtiger	  et	  al.	  2010,	  p.	  48.	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An	  alternative	  systemic	  formulation	  I:	  The	  deliberative	  stance	  and	  the	  deliberative	  system	  
In	  the	  opening	  section	  of	  this	  article,	  we	  noted	  that	  Mansbridge’s	  1999	  essay	  that	  
introduced	  the	  term	  deliberative	  system	  intends	  this	  concept	  to	  serve	  in	  fostering	  a	  citizen-­‐
centred	  democratic	  theory	  and	  sketches	  what	  we	  have	  called	  an	  expansive	  approach	  to	  
deliberative	  systems	  which	  uses	  this	  concept	  to	  draw	  attention	  to	  two	  points.	  First,	  that	  
deliberative	  democracy	  is	  simply	  one	  species	  of	  the	  genus	  of	  democratic	  deliberation	  (i.e.	  
deliberation	  between	  equals	  orientated	  to	  a	  shared	  practical	  judgment)	  and	  can	  be	  
extended	  to	  aspects	  of	  everyday	  talk.	  Second,	  that	  anyone	  concerned	  with	  deliberative	  
democracy	  must	  also	  be	  concerned	  with	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  discursive	  action	  and	  
interaction	  that	  shapes	  and	  affects	  its	  quality.	  In	  this	  section,	  we	  briefly	  elaborate	  this	  
expansive	  conception	  of	  deliberative	  systems	  in	  order	  to	  articulate	  an	  approach	  to	  
theorising	  deliberative	  systems	  that	  maintains	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  normative	  core	  of	  
deliberative	  democracy	  as	  an	  ideal.	  
To	  begin	  sketching	  this	  alternative,	  we	  start	  with	  the	  presumption	  that	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  
distinguish	  between	  democratic	  deliberation	  and	  the	  broader	  discursive	  system,	  where	  the	  
latter	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  ‘scaffolding’	  or	  ‘support’	  for	  deliberation.	  This	  does	  not	  entail	  
falling	  back	  on	  the	  highly	  delimited	  account	  of	  deliberation	  within	  some	  ideal	  theoretical	  
accounts:	  the	  scope	  of	  democratic	  deliberation	  can	  encompass	  empowered	  space,	  public	  
space	  and/or	  everyday	  talk.	  However,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Mansbridge’s	  account	  from	  1999	  of	  
everyday	  talk	  in	  which	  she	  is	  willing	  to	  loosen	  the	  criteria	  for	  deliberation	  to	  encompass	  a	  
broad	  range	  of	  talk,	  we	  have	  a	  more	  restricted	  account	  of	  the	  type	  of	  everyday	  talk	  that	  can	  
be	  considered	  deliberation,	  namely,	  forms	  of	  political	  talk	  that	  involve	  taking	  what	  we	  term	  
a	  ‘deliberative	  stance’,	  namely,	  a	  relation	  to	  others	  as	  equals	  engaged	  in	  the	  mutual	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exchange	  of	  reasons	  oriented	  as	  if	  to	  reaching	  a	  shared	  practical	  judgment.	  This	  stance	  is	  
not	  restricted	  to	  any	  particular	  setting,	  formal	  or	  informal,	  decision-­‐making	  or	  not,	  although	  
its	  demands	  on	  individuals	  will	  vary	  across	  such	  settings	  dependent	  on	  the	  norms	  that	  
structure	  the	  context	  of	  discursive	  interaction	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  norms	  are	  
institutionally	  entrenched.	  Our	  interest	  is	  in	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  citizens	  have	  the	  capacity	  
and	  disposition	  to	  take	  up	  a	  deliberative	  stance,	  whether	  towards	  actual	  formal	  decisions	  or	  
towards	  issues	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  public	  consideration,	  including	  extant	  social	  
norms.60	  Such	  an	  approach	  resonates	  with	  Mansbridge’s	  expressed	  commitment	  in	  her	  turn	  
to	  everyday	  talk	  in	  ensuring	  ‘a	  democratic	  theory	  that	  puts	  the	  citizen	  at	  the	  center’;61	  a	  
commitment	  that	  we	  have	  suggested	  is	  overlooked	  in	  the	  more	  recent	  systemic	  turn.	  	  
The	  deliberative	  stance	  is	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  orientation;	  one	  that	  is	  challenging	  and	  fragile.	  
The	  aim	  for	  deliberative	  democrats	  is	  to	  consider	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  system	  enables	  (or	  
obstructs)	  the	  deliberative	  stance	  on	  the	  part	  of	  citizens.	  We	  agree	  with	  Mansbridge	  that	  it	  
is	  crucial	  to	  focus	  on	  democratic	  deliberation	  (in	  our	  sense)	  in	  the	  everyday,	  particularly	  
because	  unlike	  deliberation	  in	  many	  formal	  institutional	  settings,	  the	  rituals	  and	  structures	  
that	  inculcate	  and	  cultivate	  the	  deliberative	  stance	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  less	  resilient.	  In	  other	  
words,	  we	  need	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  challenges	  of	  adopting	  and	  cultivating	  the	  
deliberative	  stance	  within	  the	  unruly	  politics	  of	  social	  life.	  	  The	  kinds	  of	  forces	  that	  the	  
Manifesto	  focuses	  on	  in	  its	  account	  of	  the	  deliberative	  system	  are	  thus	  worthy	  of	  
investigation,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  role	  they	  play	  in	  upholding	  or	  undermining	  democratic	  
deliberation.	  So,	  for	  example,	  to	  what	  extent	  and	  under	  what	  circumstances	  do	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  See	  Chambers	  2012,	  p.	  61	  for	  a	  similar	  formulation.	  	  
61	  Mansbridge	  1999,	  p.	  272.	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partisanship,	  expertise,	  consumption	  practices	  and	  the	  like	  sustain	  or	  undermine	  the	  
conditions	  for	  taking	  up	  a	  deliberative	  stance?	  To	  what	  extent	  does	  the	  existing	  discursive	  
field	  enable	  a	  deliberative	  stance?	  Such	  factors	  will	  be	  constitutive	  of	  the	  sites	  and	  
occasions	  of	  democratic	  deliberation;	  but	  are	  not	  themselves	  forms	  of	  democratic	  
deliberation.	  
This	  expansive	  approach	  ties	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  deliberative	  system	  much	  more	  closely	  to	  the	  
normative	  core	  of	  deliberative	  democratic	  theory.	  This	  contrasts	  with	  systemic	  approaches	  
that	  fail	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  capacity	  and	  disposition	  to	  adopt	  the	  deliberative	  stance,	  that	  do	  
not	  adequately	  recognise	  democratic	  deliberation	  as	  a	  distinct	  type	  of	  activity	  or	  practice:	  a	  
practice	  which	  itself	  must	  be	  practiced.	  	  Attending	  to	  the	  deliberative	  stance	  gives	  us	  a	  way	  
of	  better	  understanding	  this	  practice	  and	  the	  conditions	  for	  its	  cultivation.	  However,	  where	  
we	  criticised	  deliberative	  systems	  theorists	  for	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  system	  judged	  to	  be	  
deliberative	  may	  be	  one	  in	  which	  no	  (or	  at	  least	  very	  little)	  deliberation	  between	  citizens	  
actually	  takes	  place,	  they	  could	  advance	  the	  reciprocal	  objection	  that	  this	  proposal	  for	  
thinking	  about	  a	  deliberative	  system	  could	  leave	  open	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  system	  within	  
which	  there	  are	  a	  multitude	  of	  sites	  and	  occasions	  for	  citizen	  deliberation,	  but	  that	  such	  
deliberation	  is	  not	  empowered	  in	  respect	  of	  political	  decision-­‐making	  within	  that	  system.62	  
The	  objection	  would	  be	  that	  if	  we	  compare	  two	  deliberative	  systems,	  A	  might	  trump	  B	  in	  
terms	  of	  the	  overall	  and	  distributed	  capacity	  of	  citizens	  to	  take	  up	  the	  deliberative	  stance	  
but	  that	  B’s	  decision-­‐making	  might	  be	  more	  responsive	  to	  citizen	  deliberation	  than	  A.	  Our	  
stress	  on	  the	  deliberative	  stance	  needs	  to	  be	  tied	  into	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  deliberative	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  We	  are	  grateful	  to	  Dennis	  Thompson	  for	  this	  point.	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system	  that	  integrates	  the	  sites	  and	  occasions	  of	  civic	  deliberation	  with	  those	  that	  embody	  
decision-­‐making	  power.	  	  
This	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  the	  relation	  between	  deliberation	  and	  the	  broader	  political	  
system	  has	  a	  clear	  affinity	  with	  the	  model	  of	  the	  ‘integrated	  deliberative	  system’	  briefly	  
sketched	  by	  Carolyn	  Hendriks.	  But	  where	  Hendriks	  privileges	  the	  connections	  between	  
formal	  ‘discursive	  spheres’	  such	  as	  ‘parliaments,	  committee	  meetings,	  party	  rooms,	  
stakeholder	  round	  tables,	  expect	  committees,	  community	  fora,	  public	  seminars,	  church	  
events	  and	  so	  on’,63	  we	  broaden	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  approach	  to	  encompass	  the	  deliberative	  
stance	  in	  everyday	  settings.	  This	  is	  critical	  if	  we	  are	  to	  attend	  adequately	  to	  both	  how	  
perspectives	  are	  generated	  and	  how	  capacities	  are	  developed.	  	  
What	  are	  the	  implications	  of	  this	  approach	  for	  judging	  deliberative	  systems?	  In	  emphasising	  
the	  capacity	  and	  dispositions	  of	  citizens	  to	  take	  up	  the	  deliberative	  stance,	  it	  considers	  this	  
capacity	  and	  disposition	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  democratic	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  
distribution	  across	  democratic	  society.	  These	  two	  dimensions	  can,	  as	  our	  discussion	  of	  
systemic	  approaches	  stressed,	  conflict.	  However,	  on	  this	  expansive	  view,	  the	  latter	  (and	  
hence	  deliberative	  equality)	  has	  presumptive	  priority.	  This	  priority	  is	  presumptive	  because	  
in	  any	  particular	  instance	  it	  is	  open	  to	  meta-­‐deliberation	  (otherwise	  the	  deliberative	  system	  
would	  not	  be	  a	  democratic	  system).	  Crucially	  though,	  to	  be	  legitimate,	  such	  meta-­‐
deliberation	  would	  itself	  have	  to	  be	  structured	  by	  the	  general	  presumption	  of	  priority	  such	  
that	  those	  who	  would	  be	  disadvantaged	  in	  terms	  of	  deliberative	  equality	  by	  a	  particular	  
arrangement	  of	  overall	  deliberative	  capacity	  would	  enjoy	  a	  degree	  of	  power,	  for	  example	  a	  
qualified	  veto	  right,	  over	  the	  decision	  to	  adopt	  that	  arrangement.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  way	  that	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63	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  2006,	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commitment	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  persons	  in	  the	  normative	  core	  of	  deliberative	  
democracy	  retains	  its	  place	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  deliberative	  system.	  
	  
An	  alternative	  systemic	  formulation	  II:	  Deliberation	  within	  the	  democratic	  system	  
According	  to	  its	  advocates,	  much	  of	  the	  motivation	  of	  the	  systemic	  turn	  is	  in	  response	  to	  the	  
limited	  account	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  that	  emerged	  from	  the	  second	  wave;	  from	  the	  
tendency	  to	  focus	  on	  single	  forums,	  be	  they	  innovative	  mini-­‐publics	  or	  more	  traditional	  
parliaments	  and	  courts.	  As	  Stevenson	  and	  Dryzek	  argue:	  ‘it	  may	  be	  expecting	  too	  much	  of	  
any	  single	  forum	  to	  redeem	  the	  promise	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  –	  especially	  in	  a	  complex	  
world	  of	  multi-­‐level	  governance’.64	  For	  Chambers,	  though,	  the	  focus	  on	  discrete	  sites	  or	  
initiatives	  represents	  attention	  to	  democratic	  deliberation	  as	  an	  institutional	  practice	  rather	  
than	  to	  deliberative	  democracy	  as	  a	  political	  ideal.	  Chamber’s	  point	  is	  an	  acute	  one	  but	  it	  
can	  cut	  both	  ways.	  One	  of	  the	  features	  that	  emerges	  from	  the	  focus	  on	  institutionalised	  
forms	  of	  democratic	  innovation	  is	  a	  concern	  that	  abstract	  and	  idealising	  normative	  theories	  
of	  democracy,	  such	  as	  deliberative	  democracy,	  offer	  a	  set	  of	  principles	  and	  rules	  that	  
provide	  only	  a	  partial	  analysis	  of	  our	  democratic	  condition	  and	  over-­‐simplify	  the	  complexity	  
of	  democratic	  practice.65	  From	  this	  standpoint,	  and	  acknowledging	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  
single	  institution	  focus	  of	  the	  ‘second	  wave’,	  the	  systemic	  turn	  in	  democratic	  theory	  need	  
not	  direct	  us	  to	  the	  project	  of	  ‘deliberative	  systems’	  but	  rather	  to	  a	  recasting	  of	  the	  form	  of	  
normative	  theorising	  in	  which	  we	  are	  engaged	  to	  what	  Thompson	  has	  called	  ‘institutional	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  Stevenson	  and	  Dryzek	  2014,	  p.	  26.	  
65	  Jonsen	  and	  Toulmin	  1998,	  p.	  6;	  Smith	  2009,	  pp.	  9-­‐12;	  Warren	  2014.	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political	  theory’.66	  This	  is	  a	  form	  of	  theorising	  that	  stays	  close	  to	  actual	  democratic	  
institutions	  and	  practices,	  building	  an	  acknowledgment	  of	  the	  feasibility	  constraints	  of	  this	  
focus	  into	  the	  construction	  of	  its	  democratic	  ideal.	  	  
Consider	  briefly	  the	  relationship	  between	  deliberative	  and	  aggregative	  models	  of	  
democracy.	  Deliberative	  democrats	  have	  generated	  a	  powerful	  critique	  of	  the	  tendency	  
within	  democratic	  theory	  to	  privilege	  the	  aggregation	  of	  preferences	  as	  a	  mode	  of	  
legitimation	  with	  little	  consideration	  to	  the	  process	  of	  formation	  of	  those	  preferences.	  But	  
in	  presenting	  this	  critique	  as	  ‘deliberative	  versus	  aggregative’	  democracy,	  they	  pay	  a	  price.	  
As	  Warren	  contends:	  	  
The	  costs	  of	  this	  initial	  framing	  to	  the	  development	  of	  deliberative	  democracy	  have	  
been	  high.	  The	  problem	  is	  partly	  substantive:	  deliberation	  and	  voting	  accomplish	  
different	  political	  tasks.	  But	  the	  problem	  is	  also	  about	  theoretical	  strategy:	  framing	  
the	  debate	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘models’	  has	  led	  to	  theoretical	  closure	  around	  partial	  
mechanisms	  of	  democracy.67	  
Moving	  beyond	  ‘models’	  thinking	  –	  the	  idea	  that	  deliberative	  (or	  any	  other	  theory	  of)	  
democracy	  captures	  all	  relevant	  aspects	  of	  democratic	  practice	  –	  democratic	  deliberation	  
can	  be	  understood	  as	  one	  amongst	  many	  practices	  through	  which	  democratic	  institutions	  
and	  systems	  realise	  a	  range	  of	  democratic	  goods.68	  It	  is	  not	  the	  only	  democratic	  practice	  and	  
will	  not	  always	  be	  appropriate.	  Similarly,	  Warren	  argues	  that	  democratic	  systems	  have	  at	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  Thompson	  2002.	  	  
67	  Warren	  2014,	  p.	  4.	  
68	  Smith	  2009.	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their	  disposal	  a	  limited	  range	  of	  mechanisms	  to	  realise	  critical	  democratic	  functions.69	  
Deliberation	  is	  one	  of	  those	  mechanisms;	  while	  it	  is	  particularly	  important	  to	  achieving	  
certain	  functions,	  for	  example	  communication	  and	  will	  formation,	  it	  is	  of	  less	  value	  in	  
realising	  others.70	  	  
The	  systemic	  question	  thus	  becomes	  one	  of	  the	  role	  of	  deliberation	  within	  democratic	  
systems,	  rather	  than	  whether	  democratic	  systems	  are	  deliberative	  in	  nature.	  Relevant	  
questions	  to	  pose	  to	  a	  democratic	  system	  would	  include:	  what	  is	  the	  appropriate	  place	  of	  
deliberation	  within	  a	  given	  democratic	  system	  and	  how	  can	  it	  be	  embedded,	  protected	  and	  
enhanced?	  What	  is	  the	  requisite	  balance	  between	  deliberation	  and	  other	  modes	  of	  
interaction	  and	  coordination	  within	  a	  given	  democratic	  system?	  Echoing	  our	  first	  alternative	  
to	  current	  deliberative	  systems	  thinking,	  the	  deliberative	  stance	  becomes	  one	  possible	  
stance	  amongst	  many:	  the	  question	  then	  is	  when	  is	  it	  appropriate	  to	  take	  up	  such	  a	  stance	  
(rather	  than,	  for	  example,	  a	  contestatory	  or	  agonistic	  stance)	  and	  what	  are	  the	  institutional	  
settings	  within	  which	  this	  and	  other	  stances	  might	  be	  encouraged?	  
These	  questions	  and	  the	  responses	  to	  them	  are	  contextual,	  tied	  to	  the	  particular	  
composition	  of	  a	  given	  democratic	  system	  and	  its	  similarities	  to,	  and	  differences	  from,	  other	  
democratic	  systems.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  ‘grand	  theory’	  of	  deliberative	  systems,	  this	  
alternative	  form	  of	  systemic	  turn	  directs	  us	  to	  the	  comparative	  project	  of	  working	  through	  
the	  roles	  and	  sites	  of	  democratic	  deliberation	  in	  different	  democratic	  systems,	  that	  is,	  to	  
building	  normative	  democratic	  theory	  in	  close	  relation	  to	  comparative	  analysis	  of	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  Warren	  2014.	  
70	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  Warren,	  one	  of	  the	  co-­‐authors	  of	  the	  Manifesto,	  appears	  to	  have	  shifted	  away	  
from	  the	  approach	  articulated	  in	  that	  essay.	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democratic	  practice.	  Such	  an	  approach	  to	  systemic	  analysis	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  being	  clear	  
as	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  deliberation	  (it	  avoids	  the	  twin	  dangers	  of	  ‘concept-­‐stretching’	  and	  
‘criteria	  weakening’	  to	  which	  much	  of	  the	  deliberative	  systems	  literature	  is	  prone)	  but	  also	  
the	  limitations	  that	  the	  idealisation	  of	  deliberation	  and	  deliberative	  criteria	  can	  involve.	  	  
	  
Conclusion	  
In	  summary,	  let	  us	  be	  clear	  about	  what	  we	  have	  and	  have	  not	  claimed.	  This	  essay	  poses	  two	  
challenges	  to	  systemic	  theories	  of	  deliberative	  democracy.	  The	  first	  challenge	  consists	  in	  
identifying	  a	  problem	  with	  the	  relationship	  of	  existing	  dominant	  variants	  to	  deliberative	  
democracy	  as	  a	  political	  ideal.	  We	  argue	  that	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  emphasis	  on	  the	  
functional	  value	  of	  non-­‐deliberative	  practices	  in	  currently	  dominant	  systemic	  approaches	  
reveals	  their	  neglect	  of	  the	  normative	  significance	  of	  practices	  of	  deliberation	  between	  
citizens	  and	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  deliberative	  capacities	  and	  mutual	  respect.	  While	  we	  
recognise	  that	  the	  Manifesto	  acknowledges	  this	  tendency,	  we	  also	  contend	  that	  its	  initial	  
efforts	  to	  address	  this	  problem	  are	  unconvincing.	  We	  do	  not	  claim	  that	  the	  systemic	  
approach	  cannot	  develop	  the	  conceptual	  and	  normative	  tools	  needed.	  Indeed,	  in	  
introducing	  ideas	  such	  as	  the	  ‘deliberative	  minimum’	  we	  offer	  an	  example	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  
work	  necessary	  for	  this	  task.	  We	  stress	  that	  the	  burden	  lies	  on	  theorists	  of	  the	  deliberative	  
system	  to	  provide	  criteria	  that	  are	  robust	  enough	  to	  guide	  judgment	  but	  are	  intelligible	  
expressions	  of	  the	  normative	  core	  of	  deliberative	  democracy.	  	  
Our	  second	  challenge	  to	  the	  systemic	  approach	  consists	  in	  sketching	  two	  contrasting	  
approaches	  that	  are	  worthy	  of	  consideration	  as	  the	  systemic	  turn	  gathers	  pace.	  The	  first	  is	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located	  firmly	  within	  the	  deliberative	  democracy	  tradition;	  one	  that	  places	  the	  citizen	  at	  the	  
centre	  of	  deliberative	  systems	  thinking,	  focusing	  on	  the	  cultivation	  of	  ‘deliberative	  stance’	  
among	  citizens	  in	  their	  formal	  and	  informal	  civic	  interactions.	  The	  second	  alternative	  steps	  
away	  from	  the	  deliberative	  system	  as	  the	  organising	  idea	  and	  focuses	  instead	  on	  
deliberation	  within	  the	  democratic	  system.	  Such	  an	  orientation	  is	  an	  example	  of	  
institutional	  democratic	  theory	  where	  deliberation	  is	  recognised	  as	  one	  amongst	  a	  number	  
of	  democratic	  practices	  through	  which	  the	  goods	  or	  functions	  of	  democratic	  systems	  are	  
realised.	  The	  value	  of	  these	  two	  sketches,	  we	  propose,	  is	  to	  make	  explicit	  the	  fact	  that	  
adopting	  a	  systemic	  approach	  involves	  a	  number	  of	  conceptual	  and	  methodological	  choices	  
that	  have	  implications	  for	  our	  understanding	  of	  deliberation,	  of	  democracy	  and	  of	  their	  
relationship;	  and	  that	  different,	  perhaps	  more	  attractive,	  choices	  are	  available.	  We	  offer	  
some	  defeasible	  reasons	  for	  making	  different	  choices,	  choices	  that	  issue	  in	  an	  approach	  to	  
systemic	  analysis	  that	  puts	  the	  citizen	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  considerations	  of	  deliberation	  and	  of	  
democracy.	  Whether	  either	  of	  these	  alternatives	  are	  judged	  attractive,	  they	  suffice	  to	  
demonstrate,	  at	  this	  early	  stage	  of	  research	  on	  deliberative	  systems,	  that	  reflection	  and	  
debate	  on	  the	  assumption	  and	  presuppositions	  that	  structure	  distinct	  approaches	  to,	  and	  
conceptions	  of,	  systemic	  analysis	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  flourishing	  of	  this	  third	  turn	  in	  the	  
intellectual	  history	  of	  theorizing	  the	  relationship	  of	  deliberation	  and	  democracy.	  
	  
Bibliography	  
Bächtiger,	  André,	  Simon	  Niemeyer,	  Michael	  Neblo,	  Marco	  R.	  Steenbergen	  and	  Jürg	  Steiner.	  
2010.	  Disentangling	  diversity	  in	  deliberative	  democracy:	  competing	  theories,	  their	  
blind	  spots	  and	  complementarities.	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Philosophy,	  18,	  32-­‐63.	  
36	  
	  
Bohman,	  James.	  2012.	  Representation	  in	  the	  deliberative	  system.	  Pp.	  72-­‐94	  in	  J.	  Parkinson,	  
and	  J.	  Mansbridge	  (eds),	  Deliberative	  Systems.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  
Press.	  
Chambers,	  Simone.	  2012.	  Deliberation	  and	  mass	  democracy.	  Pp.	  52-­‐71	  in	  J.	  Parkinson	  and	  J.	  
Mansbridge	  (eds),	  Deliberative	  Systems.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Cohen,	  Joshua.	  1996.	  Deliberation	  and	  democratic	  legitimacy.	  Pp.	  17-­‐34	  in	  A.	  Hamlin	  and	  P.	  
Pettit	  (eds),	  The	  Good	  Polity.	  Oxford:	  Blackwell.	  	  
Dryzek,	  John.	  2010.	  Foundations	  and	  Frontiers	  of	  Deliberative	  Governance.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press.	  
Dryzek,	  John.	  2011.	  Global	  democratization:	  soup,	  society,	  or	  system.	  Ethics	  and	  
International	  Affairs,	  25,	  211-­‐234.	  	  
Fricker,	  Miranda.	  2007.	  Epistemic	  Injustice:	  Power	  and	  the	  Ethics	  of	  Knowing.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press.	  
Fung,	  Archon.	  2003.	  Survey	  article:	  recipes	  for	  public	  spheres:	  eight	  institutional	  design	  
choices	  and	  their	  consequences.	  The	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Philosophy,	  11,	  338-­‐367.	  
Fung,	  Archon.	  2005.	  Deliberation	  before	  the	  revolution:	  towards	  an	  ethics	  of	  deliberative	  
democracy	  in	  an	  unjust	  world.	  Political	  Theory,	  33,	  397-­‐419.	  	  
Goodin,	  Robert.	  2008.	  Innovating	  Democracy.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Grönlund,	  Kimmo,	  André	  Bächtiger	  and	  Maija	  Setälä,	  (eds).	  2014.	  Deliberative	  Mini-­‐Publics:	  
Involving	  Citizens	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Process.	  Colchester:	  ECPR	  Press.	  
37	  
	  
Gutmann,	  Amy	  and	  Dennis	  Thompson.	  1996.	  Democracy	  and	  Disagreement.	  Cambridge,	  
MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press.	  
Gutmann,	  Amy	  and	  Dennis	  Thompson.	  1999.	  Democratic	  disagreement.	  Pp.	  243-­‐280	  in	  S.	  
Macedo	  (ed.),	  Deliberative	  Politics.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Habermas,	  Jurgen.	  1996.	  Between	  Facts	  and	  Norms.	  Cambridge:	  Polity.	  
Hendriks,	  Carolyn	  M.	  2006.	  Integrated	  deliberation:	  reconciling	  civil	  society’s	  dual	  role	  in	  
deliberative	  democracy.	  Political	  Studies,	  54,	  486-­‐508.	  
Jonsen,	  Albert	  R.	  and	  Stephen	  Toulmin.	  1998.	  The	  Abuse	  of	  Casuistry:	  A	  History	  of	  Moral	  
Reasoning.	  Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press.	  
Laden,	  Anthony	  S.	  2004.	  Taking	  the	  distinction	  between	  persons	  seriously.	  Journal	  of	  Moral	  
Philosophy	  1,	  277-­‐292.	  
Reasoning:	  A	  Social	  Picture.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  	  
Mansbridge,	  Jane,	  James	  Bohman,	  Simone	  Chambers,	  Thomas	  Christiano,	  Archon	  Fung,	  
John	  Parkinson,	  Dennis	  F.	  Thompson	  and	  Mark	  E.	  Warren.	  2012.	  A	  systemic	  
approach	  to	  deliberative	  democracy.	  Pp.	  1-­‐26	  in	  J.	  Parkinson	  and	  J.	  Mansbridge	  
(eds),	  Deliberative	  Systems.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Mansbridge,	  Jane.	  1999.	  Everyday	  talk	  and	  the	  deliberative	  system.	  Pp.	  211-­‐242	  in	  S.	  
Macedo	  (ed.),	  Deliberative	  Politics.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Owen,	  David.	  2010.	  Responsibilities	  of	  Justice.	  Pp.	  in	  S.	  Seubert	  and	  P.	  Niesen	  (eds),	  Die	  
Grenzen	  des	  Privaten.	  Die	  Grenzen	  des	  Privaten.	  Schriftenreihe	  der	  Sektion	  für	  






Parkinson,	  John.	  2006.	  Deliberating	  in	  the	  Real	  World.	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  
Parkinson,	  John.	  2012.	  Democratizing	  deliberative	  systems.	  Pp.	  151-­‐172	  in	  J.	  Parkinson	  and	  
J.	  Mansbridge	  (eds),	  Deliberative	  Systems.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Smith,	  Graham.	  2009.	  Democratic	  Innovations:	  Designing	  Institutions	  for	  Citizen	  
Participation.	  Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Steiner,	  Jürg,	  André	  Bächtiger,	  Markus	  Spörndli	  and	  Marco	  R.	  Steenbergen.	  2004.	  
Deliberative	  Politics	  in	  Action:	  Analyzing	  Parliamentary	  Discourse.	  Cambridge:	  
Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Stevenson,	  Hayley	  and	  John	  Dryzek.	  2014.	  Democratizing	  Global	  Climate	  Governance.	  
Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  
Thompson,	  Dennis	  F.	  2002.	  Just	  Elections:	  Creating	  a	  Fair	  Electoral	  Process	  in	  the	  U.S..	  
Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	  	  
Thompson,	  Dennis	  F.	  2008.	  Deliberative	  democratic	  theory	  and	  empirical	  political	  science.	  
Annual	  Review	  of	  Political	  Science,	  11,	  497–520.	  
Warren,	  Mark.	  2014.	  A	  Problem-­‐based	  Approach	  to	  Democratic	  Theory.	  Paper	  presented	  at	  
the	  University	  of	  Amsterdam	  (20	  May	  2014).	   	  




Young,	  Iris	  M.	  2007.	  Global	  Challenges:	  War,	  Self-­‐Determination	  and	  Responsibility	  for	  
Justice.	  Cambridge:	  Polity	  Press.	  
	  
	  
